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1 Introduction
The Formula One (F1) motor racing series has become big business. It started with
the 1950 season, in which 7 races were followed by spectators at the circuits only.
Today, a F1 season consists of 17 races and its television audience runs to billions.
According to FIA (1999), for instance, the races of the 1999 season (including training
and qualifying) attracted over 57 billion television viewers in 206 different countries.
Most league sports like soccer or football have a smaller audience since they are usually
subject to national interest only. The Soccer World Championship and the Olympic
Games reach similar television rates. But they take place every four years only. The
F1 series is therefore one of the world’s most followed sport events. By selling broad-
casting rights and attracting sponsors, the organizer of the F1 series, the Fe´de´ration
Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), transforms this fan interest into a huge revenue.
It is estimated that the FIA’s average annual TV revenue (without other revenue from
e.g. merchandising and sponsoring) amounts to 510 million US$.1
A remarkable feature of the F1 series is the tendency to frequent rule changes. In
the past 15 years there were on average 9 changes per season.2 It is apparent that
these rule changes often impede the performance of the racing teams. Examples are
all regulations which restrict the technical capability of the cars, e.g. the definition of a
maximum bodywork height/width in 1969 and a minimum cockpit dimensions in 1972,
the ban of electronic control in 1994 and the reduction of engine capacity in 1995. The
FIA as the rule setting organization often justifies this kind of regulation by the safety
of drivers and, indeed, the F1 races have become considerably safer. Today, only one in
every 300 accidents is serious or fatal, compared with one in every ten accidents in the
1950s and 1960s. But there were other rule changes which can hardly be justified by
safety arguments. In the 2003 season, for example, the number of qualifying per driver
rounds was reduced to one and the teams were no longer allowed to change settings of
the cars between the qualifying session and the race. Such rule changes usually reduce
the performance of the teams, but obviously have less to do with driver safety.
The aim of this paper is to provide an economic explanation of such rule changes.
1Day, J., ’Formula One Teams to Fight Pay-TV Plans’, Media Guardian, February 22, 2002.
2This and the following information can be found on the website http://www.f1technical.net.
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For that purpose, we develop a two-stage model which reflects the specific features of
a F1 season. In the first stage, the FIA decides whether to change the rules or not. In
doing so, it maximizes its broadcasting revenue which is positively correlated with the
fan interest. The fan interest, in turn, is increasing in the (total or average) perfor-
mance of the racing teams and in competitive balance between the teams. Performance
is an index measuring, for example, the speed and horse power of the racing cars. Com-
petitive balance is understood as the uncertainty of the winner of the F1 season. This
winner is determined in the second stage of the model where racing teams with different
abilities in converting effort into performance compete for a trophy money which the
FIA finances out of its broadcasting revenue. The team competition is modeled as an
imperfectly discriminating contest first considered by Tullock (1980). A team expends
effort in order to improve its performance and the probability of winning the season,
but to a certain degree its success is also determined by chance.
Within this framework, we model a rule change either by a uniform reduction in
the teams’ abilities or by a decline in the discriminatory power of the contest. The
focus is on these two types of rule changes since they reflect almost all regulations we
observe in the F1 series. All restrictions of the cars’ technical properties like the ban of
electronic control or the reduction in engine capacity can be interpreted as a fall in the
teams’ ability. A decrease in the discriminatory power means that the outcome of the
F1 season is determined to a larger part by chance. This type of rule changes includes,
for example, the reduction in the number of qualifying rounds as such a reduction
increases the impact of external factors like the weather on the outcome of the single
races and the whole season. Our theoretical analysis shows that both types of rule
changes typically lower the teams’ total and average performance, but also improve
competitive balance since they restrict the relative advantage of the stronger team.
Hence, the FIA decides to implement the rule change, if the revenue gain from the
increase in balance outweighs the revenue loss from the reduction in performance.
Using a data set on the F1 seasons 1950-2005, we empirically test this theoretical
model by estimating its two main implications. First, the theoretical model predicts
that rule changes at the beginning of a season are the more likely and the more compre-
hensive, the smaller competitive balance has been in the previous season. We test this
2
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implication by using a Poisson model and show that a unit increase in the standard
deviation of points scored by the teams in a F1 season significantly raises the expected
number of rule changes in the next season by about 2.2%. Second, we use a 2SLS re-
gression to test the implication that rule changes at the beginning of a season improve
competitive balance during the season. The results confirm a positive relation. More
specific, the FIA distinguishes ’safety regulations’ and ’other regulations’. We show
that a 10% increase in the number of safety regulations reduces the standard deviation
of points scored by the racing teams by 7.3%, while a 10% increase in the number of
other regulations reduces this standard deviation even by 7.8%.
Our paper is closely related to the rapidly growing literature on sports economics.
Excellent surveys on sports economics are given by Fort and Quirk (1995) and Szyman-
ski (2003). But this literature mainly analyses the impact of specific measures like e.g.
revenue sharing in league sports. We are unaware of any empirical or theoretical study
focusing on (F1) motor racing. Our theoretical model is also related to the literature
on contest design. Baik (1994, 2004) and Nti (1999) investigate asymmetric contests
which are similar to the team contest in the second stage of our model. However, there
are several important differences to our analysis. First, they figure out the impact of
changes in the teams’ abilities on the teams’ effort levels, not on the teams’ perfor-
mances. Focusing on effort is suitable in contests like rent-seeking where the contest
designer’s objective is equal to the sum of bribes she receives. But in our framework we
have to consider performance since the FIA’s revenue is increasing in the fan interest
which, beside competitive balance, depends on e.g. the sp ed of the cars (performance)
and not on the amount of money the teams invest (effort). Second, and related to the
first point, their results cannot be used to explain the rule changes in F1, even if we
would assume that the FIA’s revenue depends on effort instead of performance. Baik
(1994, 2004) shows that total/average effort is maximized in the even contest where
competitive balance is the highest. Hence, if the FIA’s revenue would be increasing in
competitive balance and total effort (instead of performance), the FIA would always
set the rules such that the team competition is completely balanced. Empirically this is
not the case, neither with respect to the ex-ante winning probabilities nor with respect
to the ex-post winning percentage of the racing teams. In contrast, our model typically
3
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predicts a trade-off between competitive balance and total/average performance and,
thus, even after a rule change the team contest is not completely balanced. Third,
Baik (1994, 2004) does not investigate the role of the discriminatory power of the con-
test. This is done by, e.g., Michaels (1988), Dasgupta and Nti (1998), Nti (1999, 2004)
and Amegashi (1999). But all these studies focus on symmetric contests and/or do not
derive the effects of the discriminatory power on performance and competitive balance.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the organization
and the basic rules of the F1 series. Section 3 develops and analyses the theoretical
model. The predictions of this model are tested in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Organization and Basic Rules of the F1
The controlling organization of the F1 motor racing series is the FIA.3 One of the main
tasks of the FIA is to set the rules of the F1 series. It usually decides before a new
season whether and, if so, which rules should be changed. Another important task of
the FIA is the marketing of the broadcasting rights of the F1 series. Until 1996, the
FIA itself sold these rights to broadcasting stations. In 1996, the FIA handed these
rights for a period of 14 years to private companies owned by Bernie Ecclestone. But
Ecclestone is one of the vice presidents of the FIA, and in this position he is also jointly
responsible for the rule setting. Hence, also after 1996 the rule setting institution (the
FIA) is in some sense responsible for selling the broadcasting rights.
Several teams compete in the F1 series. A team is allowed to participate with two
cars. It employs mechanics who set up the cars and the other technical equipment,
and drivers who are still important although the success of a team is by now largely
determined by the technical quality of the cars. The main revenue source of the teams
is sponsoring. The leading teams usually experience comprehensive support from com-
panies of the automobile industry. Payments received from the FIA represent another
important revenue source of the racing teams. The FIA shares a part of its broadcast-
ing revenue with the racing teams according to their rankings at the end of the season.
This revenue source is significant as it covers about 20% of the teams’ total costs.
3All the following information on the F1 series can be found at the website www.fia.com.
4
Page 5 of 23
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
The ranking of the teams is determined as follows. A F1 season usually consists
of 17 events. An event lasts for three days. During the first two days the drivers
have free practice and qualifying sessions. The race itself takes place on the third day.
The drivers’ starting positions in the race are determined by their performance in the
qualifying. The driver who registers the fastest qualifying time starts from the pole
position followed by the driver with the second qualifying time and so on. The drivers
get points according to their rankings at the end of the race. For instance, in the
season 2003 the first eight ranks of a race get points which go down from 10 to 1. At
the end of a season, the FIA awards two titles. In the drivers’ championship, drivers
accumulate the points scored in all 17 races and the driver with the most points wins
the title. In the constructors’ championship, each team adds together the points scored
by its drivers and the title is awarded to the team with the largest number of points.
3 Theoretical Model
Based on the information given in the previous section, we view a F1 season as a two-
stage process. At the first stage, the FIA as the organizer of the F1 series decides
whether to change the rules of the previous season or not. At the second stage, the
racing teams take the rules as given and compete in a contest in hope of obtaining
(a part of the) broadcasting revenue collected by the FIA. This two-stage process
is solved recursively in order to obtain a subgame-perfect solution. In doing so, we
assume that the FIA and the teams are profit maximizer. An argument in favor
of profit-maximizing behavior of the racing teams is that they are often under the
control of profit-maximizing companies of the automobile industry. The transfer of the
broadcasting rights to profit-maximizing companies may be seen as an indication that
profit considerations play a role in the rule setting of the FIA.
3.1 Stage 2: Team Competition
The team competition is modeled as a contest. To make our point, it suffices to focus
on a contest with two teams. We explicitly model the constructors’ championship only
and ignore the drivers’ championship. A team is therefore treated as a single player.
5
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Effort of team i = 1, 2 is denoted by ei. It reflects the salary of the drivers and the
cost of developing and producing the cars (e.g. material cost and the salary of the
mechanics). Team i’s effective amount of effort is represented by αiei. The parameter
αi may be interpreted as team i’s ability of transforming effort into effective units. We
assume α1 > α2, i.e. team 1 is more able than team 2. Such a difference in abilities may
reflect, for example, differences in the drivers’ and engineers’ skills. Another reason for
heterogeneous abilities, which we will refer to below, is the different success in previous
seasons. A team is often the more experienced and thus the more able in the present
season, the more successful it has been in the past. Such a ’learning-by-winning’ effect
is in particular relevant for the F1 series since the ability to realize a good performance
of the cars and the drivers depends to a high degree on trial and error.
The performance of team i is denoted by hi. It is an increasing function of team i’s
effective effort according to the relation hi = (αiei)
r with r > 0. Performance hi can
best be viewed as an aggregate of several indicators which describe the characteristics
of team i’s cars and drivers. Examples for such indicators are the maximum speed, the
horsepower or the air drag coefficient of team i’s car, the physical and mental strength
of team i’s drivers, the minimum time a driver of team i needs for the qualifying round
on a ’representative’ circuit or the inverse of the failure rate of team i’s cars during
the races of the F1 season. More loosely speaking, hi reflects the ability of team i to
optimize the interaction between the drivers’ and the cars’ performance such that they
perform well in a typical race of the F1 series.
The teams expend resources in hope of winning (a part of) the trophy money v >
0. This trophy money is financed by the FIA out of its revenue from selling the
broadcasting rights. It is divided among the teams according to their success during
the season. To model such success-orientated payments in a simple way, we assume
that each team obtains a share of v which reflects the team’s share at total points. For
example, if a team achieves 20% of total points, it also gets 20% of the trophy money
v. Furthermore, we assume that team i’s share at total points, pi, equals the share of
its performance at total performance of both teams, i.e.
pi =
hi
hi + hj
=
(αiei)
r
(αiei)r + (αjej)r
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (1)
The larger team i’s performance relatively to team j’s performance, the larger is team
6
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i’s share at total points. From an ex ante point of view, pi can be interpreted as team
i’s winning probability and piv is expected trophy money of team i.
4
According to equation (1), the parameter r may be interpreted as discriminatory
power of the contest. It measures to what extent the contest outcome is determined
by chance and to what extent by the teams’ effort levels. In the extreme case of
r →∞, the contest is perfectly discriminating. Effort is then the only determinant of
the contest outcome and the team with the higher effective effort level wins all points.
For instance, if αiei > αjej, then r →∞ implies pi = 1 and pj = 0. In contrast, effort
does not influence the contest outcome at all if r → 0. The winning probabilities of the
teams are then pi = pj = 1/2 and the contest outcome is determined solely by chance.
To put it another way, the smaller the discriminatory power r, the less sensitive is the
contest outcome to variations in effort levels and the larger is the influence of chance.
Expected profit of team i equals the team’s expected trophy money less effort, i.e.5
Πi(ei, ej) = piv − ei =
(αiei)
r
(αiei)r + (αjej)r
v − ei, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (2)
Team i chooses effort such that its profit (2) is maximized. In doing so, it takes as
given the effort of team j and the rules set by the FIA at stage 1 of the F1 season. We
look for a pure-strategy equilibrium. The equilibrium is determined by the first- and
second-order conditions of the teams’ profit maximization. These conditions read
Πiei(ei, ej) =
rαi(αiei)
r−1(αjej)
r
[(αiei)r + (αjej)r]2
v − 1 = 0, (3)
Πieiei(ei, ej) =
rα2i (αiei)
r−2(αjej)
r[(r − 1)(αjej)
r − (r + 1)(αiei)
r]
[(αiei)r + (αjej)r]3
v < 0, (4)
4Another modeling of the success-orientated payments is to explicitly assume that the FIA divides
the whole trophy money v into a first prize for the winner and second prize for the looser. See e.g.
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Szymanski and Valletti (2005). We prefer the above modeling for
several reasons. First, the FIA usually does not award differentiated prizes. Second, our empirically
analysis focuses on the explanation of the ’technical’ rule changes, not on the prize policy of the FIA.
It is therefore suitable to model the FIA’s prize setting behavior as simply as possible. Finally, our
approach approximates the division of the trophy money into a first and second prize and, thus, it
seems reasonable that our basic insights will not be changed if several prizes are modeled explicitly.
5For simplicity, we ignore other important revenue sources of the teams like sponsoring and adver-
tising. It is straightforward to include these sources in our model. But this would merely complicate
the analysis without adding further insights.
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for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. The first-order condition (3) immediately implies that in
equilibrium both teams choose the same effort, i.e. e1 = e2 =: e
∗. The closed-form
solution for equilibrium effort can be computed from (3) as
e∗ =
rαr1α
r
2v
(αr1 + α
r
1)
2
. (5)
Since team 1 is more able than team 2, it realizes a higher performance and a higher
chance of winning. Inserting e∗ into (1) gives the equilibrium winning probabilities
p∗1 =
αr1
αr1 + α
r
2
>
αr2
αr1 + α
r
2
= p∗2. (6)
Using (5) and (6) in (2) yields equilibrium profits
Π1∗ =
αr1[α
r
1 + (1− r)α
r
2]
(αr1 + α
r
2)
2
v >
αr2[α
r
2 + (1− r)α
r
1]
(αr1 + α
r
2)
2
v = Π2∗. (7)
Hence, equilibrium profit of team 1 is larger than that of team 2. For e∗ to be a pure-
strategy equilibrium, profits of both teams have to be nonnegative at e∗. Equation (7)
implies that Π1∗ > Π2∗ ≥ 0 if and only if
r ≤ 1 + αr2/α
r
1 < 2. (8)
We suppose the parameters r, α1 and α2 satisfy this condition throughout. Note that
the second-order condition (4) is then satisfied as well, implying both teams attain a
profit maximum at e∗. To sum up, if condition (8) is satisfied, then e∗ from (5) is the
unique pure strategy Nash-equilibrium of the team contest.
3.2 Stage 1: Contest Regulation
Having solved the team contest, we now turn to the rule setting of the FIA at the
first stage of the F1 season. The larger the fan interest in the F1 races, the larger is
the profit a broadcasting station can realize with the TV coverage of the races and
the larger is the willingness to pay of the station for the broadcasting rights of the F1
series. The revenue of the FIA from selling broadcasting rights is therefore positively
correlated with the fan interest in the F1 series. The fan interest, in turn, is increasing
in two variables. First, fans are interested in races with high performances of the
teams. For example, if the maximum speed of the cars is high, the number of viewers
8
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will usually be larger than in case where the cars are quite gammy. Second, fans like
close contests. The more uncertain the outcome of the F1 season, the more exciting is
the season and the larger is the number of people who are willing to follow the races.
To put it the other way round, if it is almost clear from the outset which team will win
the championship, then the F1 season is rather uninteresting for the fans.
To model these properties, we assume that the FIA’s revenue from selling the broad-
casting rights is a function R(a∗, b∗) where
a∗ = h∗1 + h
∗
2 =
(rvαr1α
r
2)
r
(αr1 + α
r
2)
2r−1
(9)
is total performance of both teams in the contest equilibrium and where
b∗ = p∗1 − p
∗
2 =
αr1 − α
r
2
αr1 + α
r
2
(10)
is the equilibrium difference in winning probabilities of the teams. Note that b∗ > 0
due to α1 > α2. The inverse of b
∗ can be viewed as a measure of the closeness of the
F1 season or, equivalently, of competitive balance between the teams. The smaller b∗,
the more equal are the winning probabilities of the teams and the closer or the more
balanced is the championship. The revenue function R is supposed to satisfy
Ra(a
∗, b∗) > 0, Raa(a
∗, b∗) ≤ 0, (11)
Rb(a
∗, b∗) T 0 ⇔ b S 0, Rbb(a∗, b∗) < 0 (12)
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives. Due to (11), the FIA’s revenue is increas-
ing and non-convex in total performance or, equivalently, average performance a∗/2.
(12) states that, for given performance, the revenue is maximized in the even contest
with both teams having the same winning probability. Deviations from the even con-
test reduce the revenue at increasing rates. These properties of R reflect the above
mentioned impact of performance and competitive balance on the FIA’s revenue.
Profit of the FIA may be written as R(a∗, b∗)−v. It equals the broadcasting revenue
of the FIA less the trophy money divided among the teams. The FIA sets the rules of
the F1 in order to maximize its profit. In doing so, it accounts for the impact the rules
have on equilibrium performance and competitive balance specified in (9) and (10),
respectively. The rules of the contest determine the trophy money v, the discriminatory
9
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power r and the teams’ abilities α1 and α2. To fix our ideas, we suppose throughout
that the trophy money v is exogenously given. Profit maximization is then equivalent
to maximization of revenue R(a∗, b∗). Moreover, we investigate the regulation of the
discriminatory power and the regulation of abilities separately. It should be noted,
however, that our results qualitatively remain unchanged when the FIA determines v,
r, α1 and α2 simultaneously.
Before investigating the FIA’s rule setting decision it should be noted that we will
consider symmetric regulations only. This means that the FIA cannot discriminate
between the stronger and the weaker team, for example, by imposing a handicap on
the stronger team. The motivation for such an assumption is that the aim of our
analysis is to explain the rule changes in F1 and that we did not observe asymmetric
regulations in the past. The rule changes in F1 always equally applied to all teams.
One might wonder why the FIA does not use asymmetric regulations, especially if it
cares about competitive balance. For instance, by restricting the ability of the stronger
team only, the FIA might increase competitive balance without harming performance
too much. In a contest with several teams, the FIA might even exclude the strongest
team as this immediately improves competitive balance and also raises performance
(e.g. Baye et al., 1993). From our point of view, however, one important reason why
the FIA does not use asymmetric regulations is that they will lower the fan interest
and, thus, the FIA’s broadcasting revenue. If the strongest team is handicapped or
even excluded, a large number of fans (at least the fans of the strongest team and a
large part of the neutral fans) will find the regulation unfair and so lose the interest in
the F1 series. Our formal model captures this aspect, if we assume that an asymmetric
rule change leads to a prohibitively high reduction in revenue R.
Regulation of the Teams’ Abilities. Let us first suppose the discriminatory power
r is exogenously given. The rule setting of the FIA may then influence the teams’
abilities α1 and α2 only. A prominent example is the one already mentioned in the
introduction. Since the season 2003, the F1 teams are no longer allowed to change the
setting of the cars after the qualifying. It is therefore not possible to employ experiences
gained during the qualifying session in order to adjust the car to the specific conditions
of the circuit. Obviously, this rule change negatively affects the teams’ abilities α1 and
10
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α2. To model such a rule change, we assume
αi =
1
ci + τ
, i = 1, 2, with τ ≥ 0 and c1 < c2. (13)
The parameter ci reflects the inverse ability of team i in the status quo, i.e. without a
rule change of the FIA. The variable τ indicates the rule changes. If the FIA chooses
τ = 0, then the rules of the previous season remain unchanged. In contrast, τ > 0
stands for the case in which the FIA decides to change the rules. This rule change is
the more comprehensive, the larger is τ . The specification of the teams’ abilities in
(13) seems to be very special. It has, however, a straightforward interpretation. If we
define xi := αiei, then ei = (ci + τ)xi. Inserting this into team i’s profit function (2)
yields Πi(·) = piv − (ci + τ)xi. Hence, ci may be interpreted as team i’s unit cost of
effort and the rule change parameter τ works like an increase in unit cost.
The FIA sets τ such that its revenue is maximized. The maximization problem is
max
τ
R(a∗, b∗) s.t. (9), (10) and (13). (14)
We want to know whether the optimal value of τ is zero (no rule change) or strictly
positive (rule change). To solve the maximization problem, the FIA needs to figure out
the impact of the rule change parameter on total performance and competitive balance
in the contest equilibrium at stage 2. From (9), (10) and (13) we obtain
sign
{
da∗
dτ
}
= sign
{
r(c2 − c1)−
(c2 + τ)
1+r + (c1 + τ)
1+r
(c2 + τ)1+r − (c1 + τ)1+r
}
= −1, (15)
sign
{
db∗
dτ
}
= sign
{
c1 − c2
}
= −1. (16)
The sign in (15) follows from the existence condition (8). It implies that performance
is harmed when rules are changed, i.e. when τ increases from zero to a strictly positive
value. But this is not the only consequence of a rule change. According to (16),
competitive balance is improved. The reason is that the relative advantage of team 1
(measured by α1/α2 = (c2+τ)/(c1+τ)) declines. In sum, a rule change induces a trade-
off as it worsens performance and at the same time improves competitive balance.6
6Two remarks are in order. First, from (5) and (13) it is also straightforward to show that to-
tal/average effort of the teams is increasing in the rule change parameter, i.e. de∗/dτ > 0. This
11
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This trade-off implies that a rule change has two opposing effects on the FIA’s
revenue. On the one hand, the reduction in performance lowers the revenue since
viewers prefer teams with high performance. On the other hand, the improvement in
competitive balance raises the revenue since viewers like close races. If the second effect
overcompensates the first effect, then the FIA has an incentive to change the rules of
the previous season. To formally prove this assertion, we consider the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for the profit maximization problem (14). These conditions read
Ra(·)
da∗
dτ
+Rb(·)
db∗
dτ
≤ 0, τ
[
Ra(·)
da∗
dτ
+Rb(·)
db∗
dτ
]
= 0, τ ≥ 0. (17)
The term containing Ra represents the revenue loss of a rule change due to the de-
crease in total performance. (11) and (15) imply that this term is negative. The term
containing Rb stands for the revenue gain of a rule change due to the improvement in
competitive balance. It is positive according to b∗ > 0, (12) and (16). If the latter
effect is negligible, then the solution to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is τ ∗ = 0, i.e. no
rule change. In contrast, if the revenue gain from the increase in competitive balance
is large enough, then τ ∗ > 0 and the FIA changes the rules of the previous season.
For our empirical analysis it is desirable to know how the difference in the teams’
abilities influences the optimal choice of the FIA. Unfortunately, our model does not
allow a closed-form solution for τ since the discriminatory power r is not necessarily
equal to one. But we can gain some insights if we choose a specific functional form of the
revenue function and then simulate the FIA’s decision. Consider the linear-quadratic
revenue function R(a, b) = γa − δb2. Setting v = 1000, r = 0.4, γ = 1 and δ = 200,
we obtain the simulation result summarized in Table 1. These results indicate that a
rule change is the more likely and the more comprehensive, the larger the difference in
abilities. The intuition is straightforward. For a small difference in abilities, the team
contest is relatively balanced even without a rule change. The negative effect of a rule
insight confirms the result of Baik (1994, 2004) that total effort is the higher, the more equal the
players are. As explained in the introduction, however, in our framework it is more suitable to focus
on performance. Second, it is well known that comparative static results in contest models may not
be robust to variations in the functional forms and that some perverse effects may occur. See, for
example, Nti (1997). Of course, this is also true for our model, but our empirical results will confirm
the prediction of the theoretical model so that the problem is less severe.
12
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Table 1: Simulation Results for the Regulation of Abilities
c1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
c2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
τ ∗ 0 0 0 3.59 7.83 12.26 16.86 21.61 26.49
change on total performance would than be more important than the positive effect
on competitive balance and the FIA does not have an incentive to alter the rules. In
contrast, if team 1’s predominance is large enough, competitive balance without a rule
change is quite worse. The FIA can then gain more revenue if she tightens the rules
such that the teams’ abilities decline and the races become closer. Further simulations
show that this result is very robust against variations in the parameter values. In fact,
we did not succeed in constructing a counterexample.
Regulation of the Discriminatory Power. Suppose now the abilities of the teams
are fixed and the FIA only has the option of regulating the discriminatory power r.
The FIA frequently used this kind of regulation in the past. The most obvious example
has already been mentioned in the introduction. Since the season 2003, the qualifying
on the day before the race consists of one round per driver only. The outcome of the
qualifying and, thus, the outcome of the race itself is therefore much more influenced
by chance. For example, if a driver makes a mistake in his only qualifying round or
if the weather conditions in this round are fairly bad, it is no longer possible to try
better in another round. This kind of regulation can be modeled by assuming
r = ρ− σ with σ ≥ 0. (18)
ρ reflects the discriminatory power in the status quo without a rule change. The rule
change variable is now represented by σ. If the FIA chooses σ = 0, then the rules
remain unchanged. In contrast, the case σ > 0 indicates a rule change which reduces
the discriminatory power, i.e. which makes the contest outcome more dependent on
chance and less dependent on the teams’ effort levels.
The FIA’s profit maximization now reads
max
σ
R(a∗, b∗) s.t. (9), (10) and (18). (19)
13
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To solve this problem, the FIA needs to know the impact of the rule change parameter
σ on the equilibrium of the team contest. In contrast to the regulation of the teams’
abilities, (9) and (18) now imply that the impact of σ on equilibrium performance is
not unique. But with respect to competitive balance we obtain from (10) and (18)
sign
{
db∗
dσ
}
= sign
{
lnα2 − lnα1
}
< 0. (20)
A reduction in the discriminatory power means that the outcome of the team contest is
less sensitive to variations in the teams’ effort levels. As a consequence, the relative ad-
vantage of team 1 due to its higher ability becomes less important and the competition
closer. This implies that competitive balance increases as proven by (20).
This positive effect of reducing the discriminatory power allows a similar argument
as in case of ability regulation. Tightening the rules may exert a negative effect on
the FIA’s revenue, if total performance declines. But there is also a positive effect on
the FIA’s revenue since the championship becomes closer. If the latter effect overcom-
pensates the former, then the FIA has an incentive to change the rules of the previous
season. Formally, this can be seen from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of problem (19).
These conditions are the same as the conditions in (17), except for replacing τ by σ.
To figure out the impact of the difference in abilities on the FIA’s choice, we are again
restricted to numerical simulation. Consider the linear-quadratic specification of the
revenue function and suppose v = 20 and ρ = γ = δ = 1. The simulation results are
summarized in Table 2. They are very similar to the case of ability regulation. The
Table 2: Simulation Results for the Regulation of Discriminatory Power
α1 10 30 50 70 90 110 130 150 170
α2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
σ∗ 0 0 0 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12
more asymmetric the teams are, the more likely is it that the FIA changes the rules of
the previous season and the more comprehensive are the rule changes. The intuition
is again that for large asymmetries the increase in the FIA’s revenue due to the im-
provement of competitive balance is large enough to outweigh the (possible) revenue
decrease due to a decline in the performance of the teams.
14
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4 Empirical Analysis
In order to empirically test the theoretical model, we offer the following interpretation
of the results. Table 1 and 2 show that rule changes are the more likely and the more
comprehensive, the larger the difference in abilities of the racing teams. Moreover,
we argued that the difference in abilities is influenced, among other things, by the
different success of the teams in the previous season. Hence, if competitive balance in
the previous season was low (i.e. the difference in success was large), then the difference
in abilities in the present season is large and the FIA is strongly inclined to change
rules before the season. In sum, we obtain
Hypothesis 1. The smaller competitive balance in season t − 1, the more likely and
the more comprehensive are rule changes at the beginning of season t.
A second prediction of the model concerns the impact of rule changes on the equilibrium
of the team contest. Equation (16) and (20) show that competitive balance is improved
by rule changes and that this improvement is the larger, the more comprehensive the
rule changes. Hence, we obtain
Hypothesis 2. The more comprehensive rule changes at the beginning of season t,
the better is competitive balance between the teams during season t.
After a rule change the teams will try to improve their performance within the new
set of rules. Since a more able team will do this with more success than a less able
team, after a while (say, one or two seasons later) competitive balance is worsened
again. If the decrease in competitive balance is too large, we return to Hypothesis 1
and the FIA receives an incentive to change rules again. By Hypothesis 2 this would
again improve competitive balance and so on. In sum, we obtain a kind of cat-and-
mouse game between the teams and the FIA. This game might explain the frequent
rule changes we observe in the F1 series.7 To test Hypothesis 1 and 2, we use data
on F1 seasons from 1950-2005. The data comprise information on safety and technical
7Such an argument assumes some kind of myopic behavior of the FIA and the racing teams. A
closer look at the rule changes in the past suggests that this assumption is not unrealistic. Modeling
rule changes in dynamic sports contests is left for future research.
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regulations at the beginning of each season, on points scored by the teams during each
season and on the number of fatal accidents during each season.8
4.1 Testing Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 identifies competitive balance in season t − 1 as a motivation for rule
changes at the beginning of season t. The safety of drivers is another motivation for
rule changes. We did not take into account this motivation in our theoretical model,
but in the empirical analysis we have to control for it since the FIA often justifies rule
changes by safety consideration. Hence, the explanatory variables in testing Hypothesis
1 are competitive balance and the safety of drivers in season t−1. Competitive balance
in season t − 1 is measured by the standard deviation of points scored by the teams
in season t − 1. This is the same indicator of competitive balance as we used in the
theoretical model.9 The drivers’ safety in season t − 1 is measured by the number of
serious or fatal accidents in season t− 1.
The dependent variable in testing Hypothesis 1 is the magnitude of rules changes at
the beginning of season t. Rule changes comprise both the introduction of new rules
and the modification or abolition of existing rules. Of course, the rule changes differ
with respect to their impact on the outcome of the races. For example, the restriction
of the engine capacity usually has another impact as the definition of a maximum
bodywork height. But it is impossible to exactly determine the impact of every single
rule change. We therefore choose a pragmatic procedure and measure the magnitude of
rules changes in season t simply by the number of rules which are modified, introduced
8The data on points have been collected from the official F1 website at http://www.formulaone.free-
online.co.uk/index.html. The remaining data can be found on the websites at http://www.f1technical.-
net, http://www.formula1.com, http://www.motorsm.com and http://www.atlasf1.com which reports
on official studies of the FIA.
9In the two-player contest, the standard deviation of p∗
i
equals b∗/2. The standard deviation of
winning percentage is a widely used measure of competitive balance in sports contests (see Fort and
Quirk, 1995, and Szymanski, 2003). Other measures include the standard deviation of winning per-
centage relative to an idealized standard deviation (Scully, 1989, Quirk and Fort, 1992, and Vrooman,
1995), the Gini coefficient (Quirk and Fort, 1992), relative entropy (Horowitz, 1997), the Hirschman-
Herfindahl index (Depken, 2002) and the ratio of the sum of standard deviations of team performance
through time to the sum of within season standard deviations of win percentage (Humphreys, 2002).
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or abolished at the beginning of season t. The underlying assumption is that the
average impact of the rule changes is the same in all seasons.
The number of rule changes is a discrete variable. Such count data are usually
treated within a Poisson regression model (e.g. Amemiya, 1986, Greene, 1993). Fol-
lowing this approach, we denote the number of rule changes at the beginning of season
t by RCt and the probability that RCt is equal to nt ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} by
Prob(RCt = nt) =
e−λtλntt
nt!
(21)
where lnλt = βx
′
t−1
. The vector β = (β0, β1, β2, β3) contains the coefficients to be
estimated. The explanatory variables are listed in xt−1 = (1,ACt−1,Dt−1ACt−1, SDt−1)
where SDt−1 and ACt−1 denote the standard deviation of points scored by the teams in
season t− 1 and the number of serious or fatal accidents in season t− 1, respectively.
The number of accidents enters our regression directly and by the composed variable
Dt−1ACt−1 where Dt−1 is a dummy variable equal to 0 for t ≤ 1970 and 1 for t > 1970.
For the seasons up to 1969, the impact of the number of accidents on the rule setting of
the FIA is therefore represented by β1 while for the seasons after 1969 it is represented
by β1 + β2. The motivation for this specification is that in the F1 seasons up to 1969
many drivers were killed in the races, but the FIA did not react with safety regulations.
Only thereafter the FIA became aware of the danger for the drivers and introduced
more safety regulations.
For the interpretation of the coefficients β, note that E(RCt) = VAR(RCt) = λt =
eβx
′
t−1 . It follows β = [∂E(RCt)/∂xt−1]/E(RCt). Hence, β shows the percentage
change in the expected number of rule changes at the beginning of season t caused
by a unit increase in the explanatory variables. Estimating the coefficient yields the
results depicted in Table 3. All coefficients are significant and the signs are as expected.
Before 1970, the lagged number of accidents had a negative impact on the expected
number of rule changes, since the FIA did not care about the safety of drivers. The
impact of the number of accidents on the FIA’s rule setting after 1970 is represented
by β1 +β2 = −0.234+0.431 = 0.203. Hence, an additional fatal accident increases the
expected number of rule changes by 20%. This confirms that safety considerations play
a role in the rule setting of the FIA. However, the coefficient of the lagged standard
deviation of points is also positive. This implies that the expected number of rule
17
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Table 3: Poisson Model for Testing Hypothesis 1
Dependent variable: RCt
coeff. std.err. t-statistic p-value 95% conf. interval
constant (β0) 0.719 0.080 8.960 0.000 [ 0.562 ; 0.877 ]
ACt−1 (β1) −0.234 0.026 −9.110 0.000 [−0.285;−0.184 ]
Dt−1ACt−1 (β2) 0.431 0.026 16.270 0.000 [ 0.379 ; 0.483 ]
SDt−1 (β3) 0.022 0.002 14.430 0.000 [ 0.019 ; 0.025 ]
Notes: (i) observations: 55, (ii) log likelihood = −1671.657, (iii) pseudo R2 = 0.148.
changes at the beginning of a season is the larger, the smaller competitive balance has
been in the previous season. More specific, a unit increase in the standard deviation
of points increases the expected number of rule changes by 2.2%. This result provides
empirical evidence for Hypothesis 1 derived from our theoretical model.10
The results in Table 3 identify the drivers’ safety and competitive balance as moti-
vation for rule changes in the F1 series. To figure out which of these two motivations
was more important in the past, we have to compare the number of accidents and
the variation in competitive balance. During the seasons 1970-1989, 24 drivers lost
their lives in fatal accidents, whereas the standard deviation in the dispersion of points
amounted to 8.223. Hence, during this time period the drivers’ safety was the main
motivation for the frequent rule changes in the F1 series. In contrast, in the seasons
1990-2005 only two drivers were killed, but the standard deviation in the dispersion of
points was 10.588. Consequently, relatively to the drivers’ safety, competitive balance
became much more important as motivation for rule changes.
4.2 Testing Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis states that rule changes at the beginning of a F1 season improve
competitive balance during the season. For testing this hypothesis the number of rule
changes at the beginning of a season is chosen as explanatory variable. Since the
10We also test for overdispersion in the Poisson regression model. The hypothesis that E(RCt) =
Var(RCt) cannot be rejected on the basis of the likelihood ratio test.
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rule changes in our data set are divided into rule changes regarding the driver safety
and other rule changes, we use this information and distinguish between the number
of safety regulations in season t, SRCt, and the number of other regulations at the
beginning of season t, ORCt. The dependent variable is competitive balance in season
t, again measured by the standard deviation of points scored by the teams, SDt. In
sum, we obtain the regression equation
ln SDt = β0 + β1 ln SRCt + β2 lnORCt + ǫt. (22)
Since this equation is formulated in log-values, the coefficients β1 and β2 represent
the elasticity of the standard deviation of points with respect to the number of safety
regulations and the number of other regulations, respectively.
The distinction between safety and other regulations is taken from the FIA. Of
course, we do not know whether the motivation for the safety regulation is really
driver safety. To cope with this problem and to disentangle the true safety regulation
from the other regulation, we use an Instrumental-Variables-2SLS model to estimate
equation (22).11 The number of accidents in the period t − 1 is used as instrumental
variable for the number of safety regulation in period t. The results are displayed in
Table 4. These results provide clear evidence for Hypothesis 2. An increase in the
Table 4: Instrumental Variable (2SLS) Model for Testing Hypothesis 2
Dependent variable: ln SDt
coeff. std.err. t-statistic p-value 95% conf. interval
constant (β0) 5.747 0.350 16.44 0.000 [ 5.056 ; 6.438 ]
ln SRCt (β1) −0.731 0.129 −5.670 0.000 [−0.986 ;−0.476 ]
lnORCt (β2) −0.776 0.157 −4.940 0.007 [−1.086 ;−0.465 ]
Notes: (i) instrumented: ln SRCt; instruments: ACt−1, Dt−1ACt−1; (ii) observations: 55;
(iii) Prob > F = 0.0000
number of rule changes at the beginning of a season makes competition closer and
improves competitive balance during the season. More specific, a 10% increase in the
11Note also that the correlation between safety regulations and other regulations is low as the
correlation coefficient between SRCt and ORCt amounts to 0.34.
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number of other regulations reduces the dispersion of points by 7.8%. The coefficient
is highly significant at the 1% level. A little bit surprisingly, even safety regulations
have a positive impact on competitive balance. The coefficient is also significant at the
1% level and implies that a 10% increase in the number of safety regulations reduces
the standard deviation of points by 7.3%. This result supports Hypothesis 2 and shows
that the FIA can indeed use safety regulations in order to improve competitive balance.
5 Conclusion
This study provides for the first time an economic analysis of the F1 motor racing series.
The main question was to theoretically and empirically determine the motivation for
the frequent rule changes in the F1 series. In the first part, we developed a theoretical
model in which the motivation for rule changes was competitive balance between the
racing teams. In this model, a rule change at the beginning of a F1 season has two
effects. It reduces the performance of the teams and improves competitive balance.
The broadcasting revenue of the organizer, the FIA, is reduced by the former effect
and increased by the latter. Hence, if the revenue gain from the increase in competitive
balance is sufficiently large, the FIA has an incentive to change the rules. In the second
part, we empirically estimated this theory for the F1 seasons 1950-2005. It turned out
that, beside the drivers’ safety, competitive balance is a significant determinant of rule
setting in F1. The expected number of rule changes at the beginning of a season is
high, when competitive balance in the previous season has been low. Moreover, rule
changes at the beginning of a season exert a significant positive impact on competitive
balance during the season, even if the rule changes are declared as safety regulation.
Beside the contribution to sports economics, our paper also highlights the usefulness
of sports data in order to test the predictions of contest models. Most of the empiri-
cal work has been on the related tournament model introduced by Lazear and Rosen
(1981). There are also some laboratory experiments on contests like the one used in
our paper, for example, Potters et al. (1998). But field experiments on contests are
rare. The reason might be that contest models are often applied to non-observable
phenomena like rent-seeking or lobbying for which data are hardly available. In con-
trast, data on sports contests are easily obtained and, thus, can help to improve our
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understanding of contests. The survey of Szymanski (2003) shows the large potential
sports data have for the empirical estimation of contest models and we hope that our
paper further encourage research into this direction.
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